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Nancy Easterlin

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND “THE DISCIPLINE OF LOVE”

I

n the past three decades, psychological approaches to literature,
including feminist interpretations, have been overwhelmingly psychoanalytic, and this is still the case even as cognitive psychology
emerges as a relevant and fruitful secondary field for literary scholars.
The dominance of psychoanalysis holds true for Wordsworth scholarship, an area in which, given the poet’s developmental concerns,
psychological orientations seem particularly apropos. Unfortunately,
Freud’s most basic assumptions about infant experience, still credited
in various forms by Lacanian and many feminist scholars, are no longer
accepted by developmental psychologists, who regard the infant as a
self-organizing system engaged in a fundamentally productive and social
relationship with his primary caregiver, usually his mother. By contrast,
psychoanalysis, which opposes union with the mother in the state of
primary narcissism to separation and individuation, envisions the motherinfant relationship as paradigmatically conflicted. Though both psychoanalysts and literary critics have pointed to the methodological weakness of placing “pathomorphically chosen clinical issues . . . in a central
developmental role,” the implications of this insight for literary criticism have not been fully examined.1
In misconstruing infant psychology and growth along the lines
suggested by Freud and his followers, many of Wordsworth’s interpreters unintentionally misrepresent and devalue both the poet’s conscious
understanding of that interaction as well as the unconscious motivations for the poet’s attachment to nature. Most especially, the adoption
of this conflict model has hampered interpretation of the “infant Babe”
passage in Book II of The Prelude, a passage whose central importance
has not, by all accounts, received its due recognition.2 In the following
Philosophy and Literature, © 2000, 24: 261–279
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pages, I will review the Freudian and neo-Freudian readings of Wordsworth, critique commonly employed psychoanalytic assumptions about
infant experience and, demonstrating the correlations between the
current research model and Wordworth’s description of infant experience, make a case for the foundational importance of mother-infant
interaction in The Prelude.
Since much of Wordsworth’s poetry is manifestly concerned with the
formative character of childhood experience, Freudian and neo-Freudian notions about the stages and nature of infant development have
been applied to the poetry with great regularity. In accord with the
procedures of depth psychology, these readings seek to uncover latent
meanings, yet in addressing the “infant Babe” passage, a manifest
statement about infant development, they find it, curiously, consistent
with the latent dynamics. Thus a common theme of psychoanalytic
readings is that nature and Dorothy are mother-substitutes who reveal
the poet’s regressive libidinal desire for union; in construing the
attachment to the mother or mother-substitute as infantile by definition,
all such readings correlate pathology with union with the mother. In Freud’s
formulation, “there are regressions of two sorts: a return to the objects
first cathected by the libido, which, as we know, are of an incestuous
nature, and a return of the sexual organization as a whole to earlier
stages.”3 Even critics such as Barbara Schapiro, James Heffernan, and
Thomas Vogler, who discern the emotional and imaginative efficacy of
mother-infant interaction, are paradoxically and simultaneously obliged
by the psychoanalytic paradigm to interpret representations of mothers
or presumed mother-figures as informed solely or chiefly by infantile
sexual desires.4
More recently, feminist readings influenced heavily by the modified
psychoanalytic models of Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan, which
focus on the hypothesized pre-Oedipal phase and its implications for
feminine development, continue to detect the poet’s regressive desire
for union with the mother—again symbolized as nature and/or Dorothy—but, in a new turn, seem especially to observe a specifically
masculine desire for control over the mother, a critical theme lent
further support for some critics by Kleinian notions of infant aggression
and the Lacanian identification of language with the Symbolic order of
the father. Romanticists including Diane Hoeveler Long, Alan Richardson, Anne Mellor, Margaret Homans, Marlon Ross, and Mary
Jacobus, among others, emphasize the appropriative and destructive
impulse of the masculine toward the feminine, thus employing a

Nancy Easterlin

263

theoretically driven gender dichotomy that is the inevitable result of
the Freudian agon.5
A strong theme, then, in thirty years of psychoanalytic Wordsworth
scholarship, is that of the poet torn between the regressive desire for
union with the mother on the one hand and the desire for separation
and individuation on the other. On the whole the most recent readings
emphasize the masculine will-to-power over the mother and all female
others, who are interpreted almost exclusively as mother-substitutes.
Though Wordsworthians have voiced concern over the lack of nuance
in emerging feminist readings and in the theory-driven character of
psychoanalytic approaches, it has not been generally proposed that the
psychoanalytic paradigm of development may be in good measure
responsible for the progressively negative direction of these readings.6
And if one of the dubious effects of recent feminist theory has been to
rescue female writers from the blame cast upon males by adopting
Chodorow’s and Gilligan’s theories that feminine development, characterized by pre-Oedipal attachment and an ethic of care, is essentially
different from Oedipal, individuation-oriented masculine development, it cannot be said that mothers are placed in a very positive light.
For whether construed as socially produced or innate, pre-Oedipal and
Oedipal stages establish a norm of conflict whose initial locus is the
mother. Of course, in the pursuit of knowledge, none of this is a
problem if psychoanalytic speculations about the infant are in fact true
to subsequent observations of babies.
As all of these readings attest, the psychoanalytic model of human
development is fundamentally agonistic because closeness to the primary caregiver is said to be at odds with selfhood and socialization, the
imperative to individuate severing infants from the parent with whom
they have existed in supposedly perfect union. Hence, central to the
agonistic depiction of the mother-infant relationship is Freud’s hypothesis of primary narcissism or primary identification itself. Moreover, for
Freud, this conflict between individuation and union with the mother
applies equally to female and male infants. Though feminist theorists
astutely note masculine bias in psychoanalytical models, they locate that
bias in the misapplication of the Oedipus complex to girls and women,
never questioning the validity of Freud’s notions of sexualized primary
attachment and individuation. For instance, drawing on Freud and his
follower Margaret Mahler, Chodorow proffers her description of this
state:
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At birth, the infant is not only totally dependent but does not
differentiate itself cognitively from its environment. It does not differentiate between subject/self and object/other. . . . The infant experiences
itself as merged or continuous with the world generally, and with its
mother or caretakers in particular . . . .
In this period the infant is cognitively narcissistic; its experience of self
is an experience of everything else in its world. . . .
After [the emergence of the first dim awareness of a mothering agent],
the infant reaches the “symbiotic” stage of “mother-child dual unity,” a
stage reaching its height during the fourth or fifth month, and lasting
approximately through the infant’s first year. During this stage, the infant
oscillates between perceptions of its mother as separate and as not
separate. For the most part, in spite of cognitive perception of separateness, it experiences itself as within a common boundary and fused,
physically and psychologically, with its mother. Accordingly, it does not
experience gratifications and protections as coming from her. (pp. 61–
62)

At first blush, the oblivion in which the infant purportedly dwells may
match a casual observer’s perceptions, but closer inspection reveals that
the psychological incoherence of the hypothesis of primary narcissism
is exposed in Chodorow’s language alone. If the infant in fact feels
merged with the world, how can it not have a rudimentary sense of
separateness—surely the premise of an experience of merger? Indeed,
can it be claimed that an undifferentiated being experiences at all, much
less is “cognitively narcissistic,” when it has neither the conception of
self nor the affective capability denoted by the second term? However
impossible to imagine, this preconscious union with the mother nevertheless presumably represents, in the mind of the adult, a lost Eden to
which he longs to return, and consequently establishes loss and conflict
at the heart of human development.
Contributing further to the agonistic tenor of the Freudian paradigm
is the assumption that sexual impulses first emerge in this narcissistic
mother-infant union, and that, in fact, the “drive” underwriting the
mother-infant bond is essentially sexual. As Freud points out,
when children fall asleep after being sated at the breast, they show an
expression of blissful satisfaction which will be repeated later in life after
the experience of sexual orgasm. This would be too little upon which to
base an inference. But we observe how an infant will repeat the action of
taking in nourishment without making a demand for further food . . . .
We describe this as sensual sucking . . . . It is our belief that [infants] first
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experience this pleasure in connection with taking nourishment but that
they soon learn to separate it from that accompanying condition. (pp.
313–14)

If in the concept of primary narcissism Freud imagines an idealized
unity that one could only resent losing, the additional inference that
the pleasure of sucking is identical in kind to sexual pleasure and,
therefore, that nursing is the ground of sexual instruction determines
that the mother must become, in the psyche of the child, seductress
and cheat. Via nursing, sexual jealousy between father and infant is
ushered into the household, and the groundwork is laid for the
Oedipal stage, when children must learn that the mother is not, alas,
theirs to acquire.
The supposition that conflict fundamentally characterizes infant
experience reaches its foreseeable conclusion in the theories of Melanie
Klein, whose ideas have been widely assimilated to psychoanalytical
literary criticism. Importantly recognizing that infants feel strong
emotions, Klein erroneously found the etiology of such emotions in
destructive impulses aimed at the mother. Klein theorized that, in the
tortuous process wherein infants vacillate between fusion and separateness, they symbolize aspects of the mother, absorbing (introjecting)
good qualities while projecting bad qualities outside of themselves.
Klein reports that
sadism . . . is ushered in by the oral-sadistic desire to devour the mother’s
breast (or the mother herself) and passes away with the earlier anal stage.
At the period of which I am speaking, the subject’s dominant aim is to
possess himself of the contents of the mother’s body and to destroy her
by means of every weapon which sadism can command.7

For Klein, then, the process of individuation is so deeply traumatic that
sadistic fantasizing constitutes an identifiable stage in normal development.
In contrast to the fundamentally agonistic Freudian model whereby
the child in the first year of life is torn between two modes of being,
present-day psychologists view development as a progressive phenomenon from the time of birth onward—and, indeed, doubt that issues of
separation principally characterize this age (Stern, IW, p. 10). In both
their views of an evolving self-concept and those of connection to
others, researchers see human infants as engaged in organizing their
perceptions and responses; continuity and growth, rather than strict
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stages, characterize development. These early modes of orienting and
relating, moreover, are universally apparent.8
For instance, Daniel Stern, a psychoanalyst and psychologist who
maps the overlapping phases of infant development based on empirical
studies, expresses the conclusion of contemporary developmentalists
that Freud’s belief in primary narcissism is fundamentally wrong.
According to Stern,
There is no confusion between self and other in the beginning or at any
point during infancy. [Infants] are also predesigned to be selectively
responsive to external social events and never experience an autistic-like
phase.
During the period from two to six months, infants consolidate the
sense of a core self as a separate, cohesive, bounded, physical unit, with a
sense of their own agency, affectivity, and continuity in time. There is no
symbiotic-like phase. In fact, the subjective experiences of union with
another can occur only after a sense of a core self and a core other exists.
Union experiences are thus viewed as the successful result of actively organizing the
experience of self-being-with-another, rather than as the product of a passive failure
of the ability to differentiate self from other. (IW, p. 10, my italics)

Observing the ability of infants to draw inferences and relate objects
and experiences with one another, Stern here refutes the claim of
Freud, Mahler, Chodorow and others that the infant’s experience is
undifferentiated. Much to the contrary, infants exhibit a capacity for
amodal perception, which enables them to experience a world of
perceptual unity. Experiments conducted in recent decades demonstrate that infants can match sensations across sensory fields—for
instance, visually distinguishing an irregularly shaped nipple they’ve
sucked from a normal one (age three weeks), matching sound and light
intensities (age three weeks), matching facial configuration to actual
sounds produced (age six weeks) (IW, pp. 47–53). Thus infants under
two months are not only aware of a world beyond themselves, but
exhibit very distinct biases in organizing it. Repeated and varied
experiments demonstrate that, though physically dependent, a twomonth-old actively seeks face-to-face interaction and, contrary to the
psychoanalytic notion that it does not discriminate sources of care and
comfort, directly perceives emotional support as coming from the
mother. When an infant of this age responds to an audiotape of its
mother’s voice but then does not get the response expected in
face-to-face interaction, it frets at the breakdown of the conversation-
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like exchange; likewise, when mothers are instructed to keep blank
faces while talking to and listening to their infants’ responses, the
babies begin to fret. Indeed, even the newest newborn acts in ways
revealing an attempt to orient relationally, for studies show that
immediately after birth infants look toward their mothers. While it is
clear, then, that the infant progresses from a state of relative
undifferentiation to greater and greater differentiation, it never experiences complete merger with the mother.9
Thus, just as a self-concept evolves out of, rather than in opposition
to, the early relationship with the mother, the emotional bonds that
develop in tandem with mother-infant interaction are not, as psychoanalysis would have it, opposed to an earlier connection or union with
the mother but result from it, as attachment theory explains. Attachment behavior, defined as the “seeking and maintaining of proximity to
another individual,” consisting of crying, calling, smiling, gesturing,
and babbling, and presumed to facilitate species survival, is observable
in human infants by six months and highly observable in the second
year of life (Attachment, p. 194). Shortly after attachment behaviors are
first observed, they become directed toward other family members. In
short, while the Freudian concept of primary narcissism implies that
connection with the mother inherently threatens adult psychic health
and extensive social relations, Stern and Bowlby claim that a strong
initial relationship with the mother provides the foundation for a child’s
growth, individuation, and sociality. When Bowlby tells us that “in the
early months of attachment the greater the number of figures to whom
a child was attached the more intense was his attachment to mother as
his principal figure likely to be,” he is noting that, far from encouraging
incestuous, infantile isolation, a strong primary bond with the mother
provides security and teaches the practical and affective rewards of
social interaction (p. 202).
And whereas Freud posits that the infant’s attachment to the mother
is a byproduct of nursing, a secondary drive derived from a sexualized
primary drive for food, developmentalists have long considered these
views in error.10 First, studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate across a wide variety of species that there is no causal relationship
between food and attachment, the most important research in this
respect being Harlow’s 1961 experiments with infant rhesus monkeys
who were isolated in cages and would cling to a cloth and chickenwire
“mother” rather than eat, and who later manifested severe emotional
and social disturbances. These findings are supported by Konrad
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Lorenz’s studies in the thirties of imprinting behavior, which demonstrate that even chicks attach to a parent-figure independent of food
availability. Indeed, primates and humans characteristically develop
strong attachments to those who do not meet their physiological needs,
a fact which psychoanalytic theory is poorly equipped to explain.
Second, Freud’s assumption that incestuous desire is natural and
normative should have struck a discordant note even in the nineteenth
century, for before the theory of natural selection and the discovery of
genetics, breeders had long known of the damaging effects of inbreeding depression. This alone makes it improbable that attachment to the
mother is mobilized by a sexual drive. An alternative hypothesis known
as the Westermarck effect, which holds that those with whom one
associates closely in early childhood are avoided as sexual objects, was
an early rival to Freudianism and seems more plausible in the face of all
subsequent evidence.11
Finally, Klein’s belief that infant frustration and anger are expressions of rage toward the mother have not been borne out by research.
If the neonate is not undiscriminating, it does not, on the other hand,
have the capacity for abstract cognition required to internalize psychically the breast-for-mother equation. In fact, before eighteen months
and the surge in language development, infants do not have the
symbolical abilities required for the fantasies central not just to Klein’s
ideas, but to all psychoanalytic theory and, further, cannot as yet direct
feelings toward specific individuals. Infant frustration is explained
more parsimoniously by helplessness, boredom, and disorganized digestion, themselves the result of a shortened gestation and premature
birth forced on the human species by the evolutionary pressures of
upright posture and fetal encephalization.12
Taken together, these developmental studies delineate the productive character of mother-infant interaction, and it is, I believe, this
essentially productive formative relationship that Wordsworth acknowledges in Book II of The Prelude.
Bless’d the infant Babe,
(For with my best conjectures I would trace
The progress of our being) blest the Babe,
Nurs’d in his Mother’s arms, the Babe who sleeps
Upon his Mother’s breast, who, when his soul
Claims manifest kindred with an earthly soul,
Doth gather passion from his Mother’s eye!

Nancy Easterlin

269

Such feelings pass into his torpid life
Like an awakening breeze, and hence his mind
Even [in the first trial of its powers]
Is prompt and watchful, eager to combine
In one appearance, all the elements
And parts of the same object, else detach’d
And loth to coalesce. Thus, day by day,
Subjected to the discipline of love,
His organs and recipient faculties
Are quicken’d, are more vigorous, his mind spreads,
Tenacious of the forms which it receives.
In one beloved presence, nay and more,
In that most apprehensive habitude
And those sensations which have been deriv’d
From this beloved Presence, there exists
A virtue which irradiates and exalts
All objects through all intercourse of sense.
No outcast he, bewilder’d and depress’d:
Along his infant veins are interfus’d
The gravitation and the filial bond
Of nature, that connect him with the world.
Emphatically such a Being lives,
An inmate of this active universe;
From nature largely he receives; nor so
Is satisfied, but largely gives again,
For feeling has to him imparted strength,
And powerful in all sentiments of grief,
Of exultation, fear, and joy, his mind,
Even as an agent of the one great mind,
Creates, creator and receiver both,
Working but in alliance with the works
Which it beholds.
(II.238–79)

Because Freudians make much of the mother’s breast as a site of sexual
excitation and thus an object arousing possessiveness and concomitant
rage, literary readings that follow Freud, Klein, and Chodorow discern
a conflictual relationship between mother and child in Wordsworth’s
passage. Combining psychoanalysis with historicism, for instance,
Richardson claims that the 1850 version of this passage, the basic
substance of which is the same as the 1805 version quoted here,
corresponds to other images of nursing in Romantic literature,
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“graphically [representing] the male child’s absorption of his mother’s
sympathetic faculty even as his primary affective bond is established” (p.
17). But it is worth noting that, although Wordsworth employs the
words “nursed” and “breast” in the passage, neither he nor the child he
describes is preoccupied with breasts and breastfeeding. Instead, the
poet’s focus on the place of nursing (“in his Mother’s arms”) and of
continued holding (“Upon his Mother’s breast”), as the cradled child is
lulled to sleep, highlights physical contact—holding and the warmth,
protection, and security that such proximity confers. Furthermore, the
repetition of “his Mother’s” in conjunction with the specific descriptions of the infant’s closeness to his parent conveys not only the
importance of continued contact but also the value, at a time when wet
nurses were commonly employed by the middle and upper classes, of
being nurtured and protected by one’s actual mother. Aware that
newborns demand to be held, Wordsworth here is less fixated on the
mother’s breast than appreciative of the ongoing nurture that originates in bodily contact. Indeed, he makes this point explicitly in the
subsequent paragraph when he asserts that as “a Babe, by intercourse of
touch / [He] held mute dialogues with [his] Mother’s heart” (l. 282–
83), engaging in a conversation-like, turn-taking affective exchange that
enables the “infant sensibility” (l. 285) to form the core of adult
consciousness.
Whereas Freud sees bodily contact and the early emotional rewards
connected to it as a byproduct of feeding, Wordsworth apparently places
primary importance on the contact itself. If the Harlow experiments
demonstrate that bodily contact and the attachment behavior soon to
emerge from it correspond to basic biopsychological needs, Wordsworth
seems to have intuited the crucial importance of holding and closeness
for infants well before psychology’s theoretical formulations.
Wordsworth clearly envisions a causal relationship whereby the
physical closeness of mother and infant, possible only through the
parent’s initiative, stimulates positive affective development whose
ultimate outcome is interest in and a sense of connection to the larger
world. As Jean Hagstrum notes, “natural and bodily energy inspires and
shapes the poetry of both tender familial affection and transcendental
vision.”13 The child’s enthusiasm is not solely the result of holding, but
equally of the other feature of mother-infant interaction on which
Wordsworth focuses, eye contact. If touch forms the most basic ground
of nurture and affective exchange, it is augmented by early gaze
behavior, as the child “[gathers] passion from his mother’s eye,” the
resulting positive feelings stimulating cognitive development and pro-
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moting the organization of sensory experience. More than windows on
the soul, the eyes are the conduit of emotion, motivating the child “to
combine / . . . all the elements / And parts of the same object, else
detach’d / And loth to coalesce” (l. 247–50)—that is, to create a
coherent picture of his environment. While “[sleeping] / Upon his
Mother’s breast” (l. 240–41) provides the security for further growth,
the progression of the passage attributes cognitive development to the
exchange of feelings he experiences as he awakens to and explores not
his mother’s breast but her eyes and face.
In asserting the primacy of visual exchange, Wordsworth is once
again ahead of Freud and his constituents, perceiving a key feature of
development recognized by current psychologists. Stern reports:
For the first several weeks after birth, the majority of the baby’s awake
alert time is spent in and around feeding and somewhat less in diapering
and bathing. What will he see? It turns out that when the infant is in the
normal breast- or bottle-feeding position his eyes are almost exactly eight
inches from his mother’s eyes (if she is facing him). We have found that,
during feeding, mothers spend about 70 percent of the time facing and
looking at their infants. Accordingly, what he is most likely to look at and
see is his mother’s face, especially her eyes. (Several earlier theories
assumed that the first and most important object the infant sees is the
breast. This is certainly not correct since during suckling the breast is too
close to be in focus.) Thus the arrangement of anatomy, normal positioning,
and visual competence dictated by natural design all point to the mother’s face as
an initial focal point of importance for the infant’s early construction of his salient
visual world, and a starting point for the formation of his early human
relatedness.14

Basing his conclusions on research that indicates the innate preference
for facial configuration and/or specific facial features, Stern tells us
that it is the predisposition to attend to the human face that draws an
infant’s attention to his mother’s gaze. As he puts it, “From the very
beginning, then, the infant is ‘designed’ to find the human face
fascinating, and the mother is led to attract as much interest as possible
to her already ‘interesting’ face” (FR, p. 37).15 It is no accident that the
normal focusing distance for the human neonate is about eight inches,
the same as the approximate distance between the eyes of the mother
and those of the infant during feeding.
Rather than the breast forming the locus of visual and emotional
development, as Freud and Klein theorized, our more recent knowledge of the nonsymbolic centrality of gaze behaviors and the maturation
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of the visual system provides a physiological basis for understanding
that psychic and physiological growth mirror one another, and that
both are primarily progressive rather than conflicted. Mutual gaze, a
nonsymbolic interaction, provides the emotional stimulation for further exploration of the environment; given the prolonged course of
human development, the human visual system matures remarkably
early. By three months of age, a human infant can track, fixate upon, or
bring an object into focus as well as an adult. Remarks Stern, “This
developmental landmark is extraordinary when contrasted with the
immaturity of most of his other systems of communication and the
regulation of interpersonal contact, for instance, speech, gesture,
locomotion, manipulation of objects” (FR, p. 38–39). Of the two other
motor systems to mature early, sucking and head movement, the latter
serves primarily to support and expand the range of the visual system.
Apparently sensitive to the efficacy of eye contact between mother
and child, Wordsworth glorifies without sentimentalizing gaze behavior,
identifying its centrality in affective development, creative inspiration,
and cognitive coherence. Securely ensconced in his mother’s arms, the
child looks into her eyes and senses her love, “[gathering] passion” that
at once catalyses his responsiveness and unequivocably identifies this
moment, through the metaphor of the “awakening breeze” that harks
back to the beginning of the poem and betokens creative inspiration, as
the origin of poetic power.16 For the time being, the motivating force of
powerful feelings encourages the “prompt and watchful” child to direct
his nascent synthesizing ability to the world beyond himself—first and
foremost, to the “object” offering these affective rewards, his mother’s
face.
This remarkably accurate depiction of the emotional and cognitive
results of maternal nurture justifies Wordsworth’s subsequent deification of the mother through the exalted terms “Being” and “Presence”
and through the introduction into the passage of light imagery
associated with her. Far from drawing the child back into an infantile
and hermetic relationship, the mother “irradiates and exalts / All
objects through all intercourse of sense” (l. 258–60)—metaphorically
shedding light on the full range of their interactions and on the child’s
early excitement about the world. Indeed, the chronological progression in the passage from interest in the mother, expressed through
mutual gaze, to interest in the surrounding environment also corresponds to developmental research, which indicates that by three to four
months infants prefer object exploration and hand games over face-to-
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face interactions (Trevarthen). At the same time, as David Miall notes in
his commentary on the dynamics of feeling in this passage, “the infant’s
feelings about an object will be governed by the feelings it senses in the
adult.”17 As the mother’s disciple, her apprentice in the “discipline of
love,” the child is united with the world through the feeling it now
reciprocates, a light which, far from following an outmoded Freudian
economy of drives and energy, is augmented through positive emotional exchange. Whereas the Freudian model suggests that we all
experience an infantile desire to return to a preconscious sanctuary of
primary union and primitive emotions (pre-emotions?) embodied in
the mother, and thus, as Homans puts it, “look for her representation in
the later objects of [our] love” (p. 49), Wordsworth envisions goaldirected living in the world (i.e., active being) as the outgrowth of the
initial mother-infant bond, which renders the child, like his mother, a
deified being who now shares with her and the “one great mind” the
status of “creator and receiver.”
Understood within the larger context of The Prelude, this passage
represents an epiphanic moment of primary importance to the entire
text, not merely expressing joy and gratitude but denominating the
source of and reason for the moral imperative to write, a moral
imperative whose emotional force precipitates the poem’s forward
momentum in Book I but remains unarticulated until Book II. More
than equal in significance to The Prelude’s other visionary epiphanies,
the “infant Babe” passage has priority over them inasmuch as neither
the experiences of vision nor the epiphanic recognitions are possible
without the founding relationship of the child and this correspondingly
grounding epiphany of the poem.
Offering valuable insights about the structural complexity of this
poem that attempts to dramatize the interruptive process of selfunderstanding even as it tells a story of apparent chronological growth,
critics in recent years have become increasingly attuned to the way
Wordsworth’s placement of insights captures the emotional and cognitive vagaries of the mind.18 So, too, the “infant Babe” passage marks,
arguably, the culmination of the poetic persona’s struggle, depicted in
Book I, to find an appropriate topic for a long poem and to fortify his
writerly resolve. Wordsworth’s self-mocking, introductory “glad preamble” (I.1–54) locates easy claims for poetic inspiration and productivity squarely in the past, and the poet, tempted alternately to luxuriate
passively in nature and to dwell on unfulfilled ambition and guilt (I.55–
272), generates his forward course out of the guilt and despair of
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feeling “[l]ike a false Steward who hath much receiv’d / And renders
nothing back” (I.270–72). But the pronounced tonal shift from this
despair to the poet’s exuberant rhetorical question—“Was it for this /
That one, the fairest of all Rivers, lov’d / To blend his murmurs with my
Nurse’s song” (I.272–74)—does not explain why “rendering back” is so
necessary. Alternating between depictions of the soul’s “fair seed-time,”
in which, alongside his playfellows, the boy is tutored “by beauty and by
fear” (I.306–307) and general commentary asserting the spiritual and
developmental value of those experiences, the remainder of Book I,
“[fixes] the wavering balance of [Wordsworth’s] mind” (I.651) and
implies the poem’s subject—that mind’s development—but it does not
explain how poetry represents a reciprocal gift to nature. Rivers, after
all, cannot read.
Coming several hundred lines into Book II after Wordsworth describes his growing love of the peace and solitude to be felt in nature,
the “infant Babe” passage explains the moral necessity of writing even
as it corrects—by anticipation—the quietistic direction of the adolescent boy’s new awareness of nature. Neither the “vulgar joy” nor dreamy
solitude are possible without the relationship that founds, simultaneously, emotional attachments and interest in the world, and this most
basic social relationship, too, is a part of nature. It is the specifically
human dimension of natural life that obligates the poet to supercede
contemplative ease and that dictates the subject of his poem, the
growth of the creative mind in nature whose source is mother-love.
Within the immediate context in Book II, Wordsworth signals the
importance of the passage by preceding it with a verse paragraph
depicting a moment of cognitive hesitation in the analysis of his own
experience, thus aligning the passage with the many like juxtapositions,
wherein despair, disappointment, doubt, or relaxation are reversed by a
overflow of emotional and/or intellectual confidence. Beginning with
the claim that he had reached a new stage in his development,
Wordsworth immediately questions his compartmentalization of experience, asking,
Who knows the individual hour in which
His habits were first sown, even as a seed,
Who that shall point, as with a wand, and say,
“This portion of the river of my mind
Came from yon fountain”?
(l. 211–15)
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Even if the adolescent’s contemplative appreciation of nature is remembered by the writing poet as a newfound joy, Wordsworth nevertheless
implies that its origin cannot be known. Indeed, the final lines of the
passage seem to consolidate this nascent epistemological nihilism:
Hard task to analyse a soul, in which,
Not only general habits and desires,
But each most obvious and particular thought,
Not in a mystical and idle sense,
But in the words of reason deeply weigh’d,
Hath no beginning.
(l. 232–37)

Taken in isolation, this passage suggests the logical endpoint of the
poem, announcing as it does a disinclination to divide life into stages
that feel to the poet like artificial constructs. Instead, in suddenly
exhorting us with the blessed life of the neonate, Wordsworth tells us,
more powerfully than he would if he stated it directly, that at least the
river of “general habits” can be traced to its fountain, identifying the
source of human well-being as the mother-infant relationship. All else is
“best conjecture,” the passage seems to say, but this we know.19 Behind
or above human life may reside some obscurely intimated divine entity,
some transcendent source or cause, the “Presences of Nature” (I.490)
or the “Wisdom and Spirit of the Universe” (I.429), but in our earthly
existence it is the nurturing mother who is confidently identifiable as
the source of the poet’s being.
In accord with this reading, Wordsworth’s claim at the end of the
poem that the successful poet’s heart will “be tender as a nursing
Mother’s heart” (XIII.207) is not a denial of his own mother’s death or
a co-optation of female sensibility, but a final confirmation and acknowledgment of all that is due to mother-love. Even while the emergent
dualism of The Prelude’s final book suggests that “love more intellectual”
(XIII.166)—spiritual love—comes from a separate, divine source than
human love, the logic of the poem, which has asserted that feeling and
creativity have their source in the mother-infant relationship, indicates
that spiritual love, which “cannot be / Without Imagination” (XIII.166–
67), arises from and depends upon human love. But more than this,
Wordsworth has taken care to point out that divine love does not
supplant human love in the poet’s affective constitution; rather, it is his
nurturing sensibility that makes possible common pleasures, sublime
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poetry, and a network of loving relationships exactly because sublime
poetry reciprocates nurturing affection, rendering back many times
over—to Coleridge, Dorothy, Mary, and, according to the poem’s logic,
Wordsworth’s readers—a love that begins with the mother.20
The stunted creature who yearns for the infantile state of primary
narcissism, a sort of intercourse without effort, little resembles the poet
who celebrates “the discipline of love” as the source of social feeling and
poetry. Surely the durability of the psychoanalytic paradigm in literary
studies attests to an abiding sexism in our general culture which
replaces the positive fact of nurture with a primarily destructive dynamics. For as Wordsworth perceived and subsequent research in developmental psychology bears out, the primary caregiver, almost always the
mother, holds enormous power, central as she is to the lifelong wellbeing of the child, and it is this positive power, so long culturally
devalued, that we have failed to see as so justly central to Wordsworth’s
vision. Certainly, conflict exists between parents/caregivers and children, but this conflict has little to do with a lost primordial union or
sexual competition for the mother: one thinks of the exhausted new
mother, her sleep interrupted every few hours by a hungry infant as yet
incapable of rendering back love and feeling or, a few years later, of the
preschooler who cannot understand the annoyance of napkins soaked
in milk and bran flakes arranged in casual piles on the kitchen table.
(I’m sure the Wordsworths experienced their age’s equivalent.) By the
same token, adults are psychically blind, however intellectually schooled
and imaginatively gifted, to the significance of these activities for the
child. Occupying such different places in the life cycle and motivated by
different kinds of commitments to our own cohorts and to other
generations, parents and children will inevitably have disagreements.
But those differences emerge against the background of an efficacious
first relationship and its outgrowth, and it is within the lives resulting
from that productive, formative time that conflict must be negotiated.
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